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Abstract
The credit-to-GDP gap computed under the methodology recommended by Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision (BCBS) suffers of important limitations mainly regarding the great 
inertia of the estimated long-run trend, which does not allow capturing properly structural 
changes or sudden changes in the trend. As a result, the estimated gap currently yields 
large negative values which do not reflect properly the position in the financial cycle and the 
cyclical risk environment in many countries. Certainly, most countries that have activated 
the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) in recent years appear not to be following the signals 
provided by this indicator. The main underlying reason for this might not be only related to 
the properties of statistical filtering methods, but to the particular adaptation made by the 
BCBS for the computation of the gap. In particular, the proposed one-sided Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (HP) only accounts for past observations and the value of the smoothing parameter 
assumes a much longer length of the credit cycle that those empirically evidenced in most 
countries, leading the trend to have very long memory. This study assesses whether relaxing 
this assumption improves the performance of the filter and would still allow this statistical 
method to be useful in providing accurate signals of cyclical systemic risk and thereby inform 
macroprudential policy decisions. Findings suggest that adaptations of the filter that assume a 
lower length of the credit cycle, more consistent with empirical evidence, help improve the early 
warning performance and correct the downward bias compared to the original gap proposed 
by the BCBS. This is not only evidenced in the case of Spain but also in several other EU 
countries. Finally, the results of the proposed adaptations of the HP filter are also found to 
perform fairly well when compared to other statistical filters and model-based indicators. 
Keywords: credit-to-GDP gap, cyclical systemic risk, early-warning performance, 
macroprudential policy, statistical filters.
JEL classification: C18, E32, E58, G01, G28.
Resumen
La brecha crédito-PIB calculada con la metodología recomendada por el Comité de 
Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea (BCBS, por sus siglas en inglés) presenta importantes 
limitaciones, debido principalmente a la alta inercia de la tendencia de largo plazo estimada, 
que no permite capturar de manera apropiada cambios estructurales o rápidos en la 
tendencia. Como resultado, la brecha estimada presenta actualmente en muchos países 
valores muy negativos, que no reflejan de un modo adecuado el entorno de riesgo cíclico 
ni su posición en el ciclo financiero. Esto ha llevado a que la gran mayoría de los países 
que han activado recientemente el Colchón de Capital Anticíclico (CCA) no estén siguiendo 
las señales derivadas de este indicador. La principal razón de estas discrepancias entre las 
señales del indicador y la actual posición en el ciclo financiero de muchos países puede 
estar relacionada no solo con las propiedades de los métodos de filtrado estadístico, sino 
también con la adaptación específica del filtro de Hodrick-Prescott (HP) recomendada por 
el BCBS para el cálculo de la brecha. En particular, el parámetro de suavización del filtro 
HP propuesto asume una duración del ciclo de crédito mucho mayor que la evidenciada 
empíricamente en la mayoría de los países, lo que lleva a que la tendencia de largo plazo 
estimada tenga una memoria muy larga. Este estudio evalúa si una relajación de este 
supuesto mejora la capacidad predictiva del indicador y su utilidad para identificar señales 
de riesgo sistémico cíclico que permitan informar adecuadamente sobre decisiones de 
política macroprudencial en los próximos años. Los resultados sugieren que adaptaciones 
del filtro HP que asumen una menor duración del ciclo de crédito, más coherente con 
la evidencia empírica, mejoran la capacidad predictiva del indicador y corrigen el sesgo 
negativo tras los eventos de crisis, en comparación con la brecha calculada con la 
metodología propuesta por el BCBS. Esto se evidencia no solo en el caso de España, sino 
también en otros países de la Unión Europea. Finalmente, se encuentra que los resultados 
obtenidos con las diferentes adaptaciones del filtro HP presentan una capacidad predictiva 
superior a la de otros métodos de filtrado estadístico y comparable con la obtenida con 
modelos econométricos.
Palabras clave: brecha crédito-PIB, filtros estadísticos, indicadores de alerta temprana, 
política macroprudencial, riesgo sistémico cíclico.
Códigos JEL: C18, E32, E58, G01, G28.
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1 Introduction
Excessive credit growth is often cited as one of the main drivers of systemic risk in the run-up to 
financial crises. Certainly, international evidence has confirmed that periods of high credit growth 
rates have preceded the occurrence of systemic crises between 2 and 5 years after these events 
materialize (Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Drehmann et al., 2011; Schularik and Taylor, 2012). This 
evidence is behind the idea of the implementation of countercyclical macroprudential instruments, 
such as the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) as proposed by the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) (see BIS, 2011). The aim of this instrument is to increase the resilience of the 
banking sector in a financial downturn through the accumulation of capital during the expansionary 
phase of the credit cycle. In addressing this aim the CCyB also help to lean against the build-up phase 
of the cycle. The accumulation of buffers in good times to be used in bad times was also behind the 
dynamic provisioning system adopted in 2000 by Banco de España (see Saurina and Trucharte, 
2017), which has been proved to benefit banks during the last downturn (Jiménez et al., 2017). 
The implementation of the CCyB is closely linked to the identification of periods of 
excessive credit growth. Thus, it would not be sufficient to identify high credit growth rates in 
absolute terms, but to identify whether the observed growth is excessive or not. In that context, 
quantitative indicators may provide useful information to policy makers on the build-up of cyclical 
systemic risk. The BCBS proposes a credit-to-GDP gap computed using a statistical method, 
as a standardised indicator of credit imbalances (BIS, 2010). This indicator, widely known as the 
Basel gap, is based on the decomposition of the credit-to-GDP ratio into a long-run trend and 
a cyclical component using a statistical filter. In particular, the Basel methodology proposes the 
use a real-time (one-sided) version of the Hodrick–Prescott filter (HP), which is widely used for 
macroeconomic series (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The Basel gap has become the standard 
indicator used not only to identify credit imbalances but also to calibrate CCyB rates across 
BCBS jurisdictions, including European Union countries (BIS, 2010; EU CRR/CRD-IV1).
The Basel gap has been selected among different indicators due to its simplicity in terms 
of easiness to be computed, replicated and communicated, and to its relatively good performance. 
In fact, the performance of the Basel gap as an early warning indicator of the build-up of cyclical 
systemic risk related to excessive credit growth has been found to be fairly good in the past 
(Drehmann et al., 2010; Detken et al., 2014; Drehmann and Tsatsaronis, 2014). However, the Basel 
gap presents several limitations, some of which have recently become the focus of attention. One of 
its main limitations is related to the large negative values that it currently estimates for many countries 
that have undergone a severe credit contraction in the recent past, even after several years from the 
end of the last crisis. The main negative implication of this situation is that it will not provide prompt 
signals of excessive credit during the next cycle. Castro et al. (2016) provide evidence of this situation 
after simulating the performance of this indicator in Spain under different credit growth scenarios in 
the next years. This is one of the reasons behind the fact that most of countries activating the CCyB 
in recent years are not following the signals issued by the Basel gap (see Chart 1).
1  EU Regulation 575/2013 and EU Directive 2013/36/EU. The use of this indicator to guide the CCyB decisions in the EU 
is detailed in Recommendation ESRB/2014/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
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The downward bias problem of this indicator has been identified to be particularly 
important when large changes in the credit-to-GDP ratio are presented. Repullo and Saurina 
(2011) discuss the limitations of the Basel gap when either credit increases or GDP decreases 
faster than the other term of the ratio. In particular, the indicator is not able to distinguish 
situations where credit growth might be justified by financial deepening or when a fast GDP 
contraction provides conflicting signals.
The inability of incorporating structural changes and link equilibrium levels of the credit-to-
GDP ratio to fundamental variables is a general limitation of statistical methods. This has led to recent 
proposals of methods based on models that may incorporate this information. Galán and Mencía 
(2018) recently discuss the advantages of these methods and propose two (semi-) structural models 
that outperform the Basel credit-to-GDP gap using a sample of six EU countries. Other recent 
studies propose similar methods, which have been found to perform better than the Basel gap 
(see Lang and Welz, 2018, for a semi-structural method applied to a large sample of EU countries). 
Nonetheless, adaptations of the specific filtering method proposed in Drehmann et 
al. (2010) and adopted by the BCBS, may still provide useful information and avoid some of 
the main limitations of the Basel gap. In particular, addressing the use of a one-sided HP filter 
and the specific parameterisation adopted in the calculation of the Basel gap may improve the 
performance of the indicator. In an application to Italy, Alessandri et al. (2015) propose a method 
to correct deviations between the one- and two-sided versions of the HP filter using forecasted 
data. In fact, a two-sided filter is able to capture changes in trends more properly. Nonetheless, 
the need of forecasted data may introduce biases and makes the estimations dependent on the 
quality of the forecasts. Recently, Martínez and Oda (2018) addresses the problem of the large 
value of the smoothing parameter assumed in the computation of the Basel gap. The authors 
find that lowering this value improves the performance of the indicator in Chile. 
SOURCES: ESRB and BCBS. Own elaboration.
NOTE: The y-axis represents the announced CCyB rate as to December 2018. The x-axis represents the Basel credit-to-GDP gap in pp. The red line represents
the BCBS recommended rule for the setting CCyB rates linked to values of the Basel gap. The grey dashed line represents the 2pp threshold recommended by
the BCBS as point of activation of the CCyB (BCBS, 2010; ESRB/2014/1).
Most countries with positive CCyB rates are not following the BCBS recommended buffer guide (red line). Even some countries with the largest negative 
gaps have recently activated the instrument.
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Certainly, the use of a large value for the smoothing parameter (400,000) is responsible 
for the large inertia of the filter. This value assumes that the length of the credit cycle is around 
30 years (see Drehmann et al., 2010), which empirically seems to be unrealistic for many 
countries. Recently, Bedayo et al. (2018) identify that the average frequency of systemic crises 
over the 1880-2017 period in Spain is around 17 years, which is almost half of the frequency 
implicitly assumed by the Basel gap. Using broad samples of advanced countries and emerging 
economies, Drehmann et al. (2011) and Drehmann et al. (2012) identify average lengths of credit 
cycles between 15 and 25 years, with cases around 30 years being at the tail of the distributions.
Moreover, the length of credit cycles may present large heterogeneity across countries 
and assuming a fixed and common duration of the cycle can be very restrictive. On this regard, 
Galati et al. (2016) identify that the amplitude and length of the cycles largely differ among 
countries after applying Kalman filtering methods to the US and some euro area countries. 
Thus, although there is some consensus in the literature on the fact that credit cycles have 
longer duration than business cycles (see Claessens et al. 2011, 2012; Aikman et al., 2015), 
assuming that its length is around 30 years seems empirically to be an upper bound rather than 
a representative number. 
In this context, the aim of this study is whether the one-sided HP filter, in which the 
Basel gap indicator is based on, is still a useful indicator of credit imbalances in the future if the 
filter is allowed to have shorter memory. In particular, I propose two different adaptations of the 
one-sided HP filter for these purposes. The first one is to use lower values for the smoothing 
parameter, and the second one is to discard older information than a certain time horizon through 
the use of rolling windows. Martínez and Oda (2018) performs a similar analysis for Chile and find 
that adapting the Basel gap to assume a shorter length of the credit cycle improves significantly 
the performance of the indicator. Also, the performance of two alternative common statistical 
filters is explored. I use quarterly data of the credit-to-GDP ratio in Spain spanning more than 
half a century: from 1965Q1 to 2018Q3. Finally, I also explore as robustness the performance of 
some of these variants in a sample of 13 EU countries.
The paper is organized in four sections besides this introduction. Section 2 briefly 
describes the performance criteria assessed. Section 3 presents the results of the proposed 
exercises using the one-sided HP filter. Section 4 presents some robustness exercises including 
an assessment of the performance of other alternative statistical filters, a comparison with 
model-based indicators, and the application of some of the proposed alternatives to a large 
sample of EU countries. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Assessment criteria
I compare the predictive performance of the proposed adaptations of the HP filter within a 
reasonable period before the onset of systemic events. In particular, I assess conditional 
probabilities, the probabilities of missing a crisis (Type I error) and issuing false alarms (Type II error), 
and the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve (AUROC). The AUROC has 
become a useful method to assess the performance of early-warning indicators and in particular 
those used to guide the CCyB (Castro et al., 2016; Detken et al., 2014; Giese et al., 2014) 
because it does not require to select a specific probability threshold. The AUROC assesses the 
relationship between the false positive and the true positive rates for every probability threshold, 
providing a measure of the probability that the model predictions are correct.2 In order to obtain 
these measures, I estimate logit regressions of the different versions of the credit-to-GDP gap 
on a variable signalling the occurrence of a systemic event 5 to 12 quarters ahead.3 This range 
is convenient for policy purposes, since too-early signals may have unintended consequences 
on credit supply and too-late signals reduce the effectiveness of the policy, mainly due to the 
one-year long phase-in period of the CCyB requirement for banks following the announcement 
of the rate by the macroprudential authority. The conditional probability of a crisis, and Type 
I and II errors are computed at relevant thresholds (2pp and 10pp). The 2 percentage point 
threshold is the reference for the activation of the CCyB under the BCBS Guidance (BIS, 2010) 
and ESRB Recommendation 2014/1, and the 10pp gap corresponds to the maximum value 
at which automatic reciprocity is mandatory between EU members. Although these thresholds 
could be optimized for the specific adaptations of the HP filter proposed, I hold these reference 
values in order to focus the analysis on the effects of adapting the filter.
2  A value of AUROC equal to 1 would indicate perfect predictions, while a value of 0.5 would indicate that the model is 
not able to improve the predictions coming from a random assignment.
3  For the computation of the AUROC, the case of signals within 5 to 16 quarters ahead of the occurrence of systemic 
events is also considered.
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3 The Hodrick-Prescott Filter
The methodology proposed by the BCBS for computing the credit-to-GDP gap is based on 
the use of a trend-removal statistical technique. In particular, the HP filter was selected for 
this purpose given the good properties and wide use of this technique on the identification of 
business cycles. This method, firstly proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) is a high-pass 
type of filter, which has the property of making stationary processes of integrated orders 1 up 
to 4. The BCBS proposes to use a one-sided version of the filter, where only past and current 
observations are used to compute the trend at each moment of time. This allows obtaining real-
time estimations of the gap but limits the ability of the filter to incorporate changes in the trend. 
In contrast, a two-sided filter incorporates these changes more properly since all past and future 
observations are used for identifying the trend. However, in order to obtain useful estimations for 
policy purposes from a two-sided filter, forecasted data is required. This may introduce biases 
related to the quality of the forecasts. 
The HP filter requires defining only one parameter, denoted as λ, which is related to the 
smoothness of the trend. In general, the smoother the trend (larger values of λ), the wider the 
amplitude of the cycle and the longer its duration. Ravn and Uhlig (2002) recommended to use 
a value of 1,600 for quarterly data when analyzing business cycles. This value assumes implicitly 
a cycle frequency of around 7.5 years, which is appropriate given the empirical evidence on the 
length of business cycles in advanced economies. In fact, business cycles have been identified 
to range from 4 to 8 years in OECD countries, with a mean of around 5 years (see e.g. Cotis 
and Coppel, 2005). 
This assumption seems to be very reasonable for business cycles; however, credit 
cycles have been identified to be longer (Claessens et al. 2011, 2012; Aikman et al., 2015), and 
its length to be heterogeneous across countries (Galati et al., 2016). Drehmann et al. (2010) 
argues that a good approximation is the length between two systemic crises. These authors 
analyze a sample of G20 and OECD countries excluding transition economies and identify 
that this length ranges between 5 and 20 years with a median around 15 years. Drehmann 
et al. (2011) identify a longer occurrence of systemic crises (20-25 years on average) using a 
sample of 36 developed and emerging economies. International evidence shows not only large 
heterogeneity in the length of credit cycles across countries, but also that in very few cases this 
length is longer than 25 years.
Despite of this evidence, Drehmann et al., (2010) propose a smoothing parameter 
equal to 400,000 for the HP filter, which is equivalent to assume a length of around 30 years. 
Interestingly, the authors identify that using a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000 presents 
the best early warning properties at gaps within a range between 2pp and 4pp. Moreover, they 
find that for gaps between 5pp and 8pp, a smoothing parameter equal to 125,000 presents 
equal performance than using 400,000. However, the authors conclude in favor of the highest 
smoothing parameter because it preserves a good performance for gaps beyond 9pp. This 
criterion implicitly favors the indicator with the largest upward deviations before historical crises, 
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which also implies the largest inertia of the long-run trend and the largest downward biases after 
crises. This study influenced the BCBS adoption of this indicator for guiding the calibration of 
the CCyB. Nonetheless, it is important to remark than in 2010, neither the BCBS nor the authors 
were able to realize that the last financial crisis could become so deep and long, that the large 
deviations that they considered desirable during the booms, could become so negative and 
persistent in many countries and for so many years.
The implications of computing the HP filter with such a high smoothing parameter 
have been identified as uninformative by many national authorities after the last crisis. In 
fact, most of countries activating the CCyB in recent years are not following the signals 
issued by the Basel gap (see Chart 1). Moreover, several countries have decided to adapt 
either the computation of the HP filter or the buffer guide in order to correct this bias and 
to incorporate country specificities. Table 1 presents a summary of the main adaptations of 
the Basel gap methodology recently made by BCBS countries in order to take decisions on 
macroprudential cyclical instruments. Germany adjusts the guide so that decreases in GDP 
will not imply higher buffer rates, avoiding raising the CCyB during an economic downturn 
(see Repullo and Saurina, 2011 for a discussion on this issue). Brazil and Russia adapt 
the gap by currency fluctuations given the implications of the exchange rate over credit in 
foreign currency. Japan combines the information provided by the one-sided and the two-
sided HP filters in their analysis. Italy incorporates implicitly the signals from the two-sided 
HP filter by adjusting the one-sided filter for historical deviations between both alternatives 
(see Alessandri et al., 2015). Norway adjusts the one-sided HP filter by including projections 
of data. Finally, Chile, Korea and Denmark use either rolling windows or lower smoothing 
parameters in order to shrink the duration of the estimated cycle. Since my main concern 
with the usefulness of the Basel gap in Spain is derived from this assumption, I assess below 
the effects of these two specific adaptations the HP filter.
3.1 The smoothing parameter
As aforementioned, empirical evidence in Spain has shown that the length of the credit cycle is 
on average around 17 years (Bedayo et al., 2018). This would be between 2 and 3 times the 
SOURCES: BCBS (2017) and Martínez and Oda (2018).
 seirtnuoCygolodohtem pag lesaB eht fo noitatpadA
ynamreGesaerced PDG yb detsujdA
Adjusted by historical deviations between one- and two-sided filters  Italy
napaJsretlif dedis-owt dna -eno gninibmoC
yawroNsnoitcejorp yb detsujdA
aissuR ,lizarBsnoitautculf ycnerruc yb detsujdA
aeroK ,elihCwodniw gnillor a gnisu detsujdA
kramneDsretemarap gnihtooms fo egnaR
COUNTRIES USING DIFFERENT ADAPTATIONS OF THE HP FILTERING METHOD 
FOR IDENTIFYING CREDIT-TO-GDP GAPS
TABLE 1
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median of the business cycle assumed with a value of λ=1,600 (7.5 years). The formula for the 
parameter λ in terms of the length of the business cycle is the following (Drehmann et al., 2010):
λ = (times the business cycle)4 * 1,600
Following this formula, the corresponding values for the λ parameter given the 
different assumptions for the length of the financial cycle with respect to the business cycle are 
summarized in Table 2.
Using the four approximated values of the smoothing parameters above, I compute the HP 
filter for the quarterly credit-to-GDP ratio in Spain from 1965Q1 to 2018Q3.4 The gap estimations are 
presented in Chart 2. In general, it is observed that the higher the value assumed for λ, the higher the 
estimated gaps and the greater their variance. On the one hand, assuming a smoothing parameter 
equal to 1,600, as it is assumed for the business cycle, estimates too-short credit cycles and very 
small gaps that would difficult the identification of clear signals of imbalances. On the other hand, a 
λ equal to 400,000 introduces too much inertia to the long-run trend leading to too-late signals of 
imbalances. In fact, the Basel gap misses 2 out of 3 systemic events identified in Spain since 1970. 
Intermediate values of the smoothing parameter signal correctly the systemic event presented during 
the 90’s, yield lower deviations after the last financial crisis, and adapt more quickly to a change in 
the trend in the last two years. In the case of λ equal to 25,000, the signals are clearer for the 90’s 
systemic event, and the drop after the last crisis is lower than using a parameter of 125,000. 
Table 3 also presents a comparison of the performance of the HP filter using the four 
different values of the smoothing parameter. In general, the filter using the lowest value for 
λ presents even lower performance than the Basel gap. However, the intermediate values 
outperform the Basel gap both in terms of AUROC and of Type I/II errors, being the gap using a 
λ of 25,000 the one presenting the best performance. 
Chart 3 plots the early warning performance of the different HP filter alternatives, as 
measured by the AUROC, at different quarters ahead of the systemic crises.  It is observed that 
the Basel gap presents the lowest predictive performance among the four alternatives 16 to 9 
periods ahead of the crises, and only get close to the AUROC values of the best alternatives 
4  The gaps are computed starting at 1970Q1 with information from 1965Q1. 
SOURCE: Drehmann et al. (2010).
Length of the cycle
(years)
Times the business cycle λ
λ
(standard approximation)
006,1006,115.7
000,52006,52251
000,521006,92135.22
000,004006,904403
VALUES OF CORRESPONDING SMOOTHING PARAMETERS GIVEN THE LENGTH 
OF THE CYCLE
TABLE 2
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between 8 and 5 quarters before the crises. The gap using the lowest λ (1,600) performs 
relatively well up to 9 periods before the systemic events but its performance decreases very fast 
and becomes almost completely uninformative 5 quarters ahead of the onset of the crises. On 
the other hand, the performance of the gaps using λ values of 25,000 and 125,000 is relatively 
good and stable during all the pre-crises periods analysed, reaching their maximum signalling 
power 9 quarters ahead of the onset of the systemic events. 
3.2 Rolling windows 
The computation of the HP filter is not only sensitive to the value of the parameter λ, but also 
to the length of the horizon for which it is computed. This can be adjusted by means of a 
rolling window, which allows discarding old observations that may not provide useful or proper 
SOURCE: Banco de España. Own elaboration.
NOTE: The dark grey shaded areas denote three financial stress periods identified in Spain since 1970, corresponding to two periods of systemic banking crises 
(1978-Q1 to 1985-Q3; 2009-Q1 to 2013-Q4) and one idiosyncratic event (1993-Q3 to 1994-Q3). The light grey shaded areas represent the period from 5 to 16 
quarters ahead of the onset of the systemic events, when it is desirable to identify risk signals for macroprudential policy purposes.
The lower the λ, the lower the estimated gaps and their variance. Gap s estimated with λ equal to 25,000 and 125,000 signal properly the systemic event 
occurred in the 90’s.
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ESTIMATION OF THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP USING THE HP FILTER WITH DIFFERENT VALUES 
OF THE SMOOTHING PARAMETER λ
CHART 2
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
NOTE: For comparability, the thresholds used for the computation of type I/II errors and conditional probabilities are the reference values recommended for the Basel 
gap (BCBS, 2010). Nonetheless these thresholds could be optimized for each of the alternatives.
λ AUROC 12-5 AUROC 16-5
Type I error
at 2pp
Type II error
at 2pp
Conditional
probability
at 2pp
Conditional
probability
 at 10pp
1,600 0.70 0.72 9.76% 87.50% 12.67% 38.78%
25,000 0.80 0.81 5.10% 77.46% 10.06% 23.88%
125,000 0.79 0.79 5.33% 79.49% 9.41% 15.51%
400,000 0.77 0.75 8.81% 85.51% 9.27% 12.85%
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP UNDER DIFFERENT SMOOTHING PARAMETERS TABLE 3
The gap estimated using a λ equal to 25,000 presents the best predictive performance and the lower errors.
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information for current estimations of the long-run trend. The use of a rolling window assures 
that the memory of the trend is shorter than the window set. Martínez and Oda (2018) apply this 
adaptation of the HP filter to estimate credit-to-GDP gaps in Chile and find that a rolling window 
of 10 years provides the best results. 
The length of the window can be adjusted in order to assume shorter lengths of the 
credit cycle. Thus, I assess three different lengths of windows, which represent approximately 
the lengths of the credit cycle assumed by the use of the smoothing parameters analyzed 
above (for simplicity I use rolling windows equal to 10, 15 and 20 years). Chart 4 presents 
the estimations of the gap using these different windows along with the standard Basel 
method, where the complete time horizon of available data for Spain is used.5 Although using 
a smoothing parameter that assumes a longer cycle than the window may still imply a large 
inertia of the trend, first I hold the smoothing parameter fixed at 400,000, as suggested by the 
Basel methodology, in order to check only the effect of shortening the horizon. As in the case of 
lower smoothing parameters, the HP filters with shorter horizons issue correct signals of credit 
imbalances before the systemic event in the 90’s and currently exhibit an upward trend of the 
gaps. Nonetheless, the amplitude of the cycles estimated using rolling windows of 15 and 20 
years is not very different than the one using the full sample. The reason is that in all the cases, 
the smoothing parameter is hold fixed at 400,000, which introduces a high persistence to the 
long-run trend estimation. These results suggest that shortening the horizon of observed data 
may capture inflection points on the cycle earlier, while it may have less effects on reducing 
potential biases. 
5  In all the cases information starting at 1965 is used. Nonetheless, the length of the window avoids real-time estimations 
shorter than the initial window. That is, for the 10, 15 and 20-year windows, the first gaps are reported at 1975Q1, 
1980Q1 and 1985Q1, respectively. For the Basel gap, only estimations starting at 1970Q1 are reported in order to allow 
the 1-sided HP filter to provide informative real-time estimations. 
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
NOTE: The vertical axis represents AUROC values and the horizontal axis represents the number of quarters before the occurrence of systemic events in Spain.
The gaps estimated with λ’s equal to 25,000 and 125,000 outperform the Basel gap in terms of predictive performance. The difference is especially high 
between 8 and 16 quarters ahead of the onset of the systemic events.
AUROC OF THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAPS ASSUMING DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE SMOOTHING PARAMETER (λ)
FOR THE HP FILTER AT EACH QUARTER AHEAD OF CRISES (5-16 QUARTERS). 
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Theoretically, the smoothing parameter should be consistent with the time horizon used 
for computations. Thus, adapting the filter in both dimensions, i.e. simultaneously lowering the 
smoothing parameter and shortening the horizon would be more consistent and may yield better 
results. This would imply approximate λ values of 1,600, 25,000 and 125,000 when using rolling 
windows of 10, 15 and 20 years, respectively. The results of these alternatives are presented in 
Chart 4 panel (b). In general, it is observed that shortening the horizon in combination with lowering 
the smoothing parameter estimate both lower amplitude of the cycles and earlier inflection points. 
Shortening the time horizon while holding constant the smoothing parameter improves 
the predictive performance of the estimated gaps, except for the 10-year rolling window, which 
seems to assume a too-short length of the credit cycle (see Table 4). In general, using a rolling 
window equal to 15 years provides the best performance at any value of the smoothing parameter. 
These results are also consistent when analyzing type I and II errors (see Table A1 in the Annex). 
It is important to remark that using smoothing parameters that assume credit cycles longer 
than the rolling window provide very similar estimations, given that the memory of the long-run 
trend implied by the filter cannot be longer than the time horizon. The same is true when rolling 
windows longer than the length assumed by the smoothing parameter are used. This is evident 
when other combinations of rolling windows and λ values are plotted (see Chart A1 in the Annex).
These results are consistent throughout all the period between 5 and 16 quarters 
ahead of systemic events, where it is observed that the alternatives using a rolling window equal 
to 15 years provide the best results, and reach the maximum predictive performance around 9 
periods before the beginning of the crises (see Chart 5). As it was identified above, when a very 
low value of the smoothing parameter (1,600) is used, the performance decreases rapidly from 
8 quarters before the events. 
SOURCE: Banco de España. Own elaboration.
NOTE: The grey shaded areas denote three financial stress periods identified in Spain since 1970, corresponding to two periods of systemic banking crises 
(1978-Q1 to 1985-Q3; 2009-Q1 to 2013-Q4) and one idiosyncratic event (1993-Q3 to 1994-Q3). The light grey shaded areas represent the period from 5 to 16 
quarters ahead of the onset of the systemic events, when it is desirable to identify risk signals for macroprudential policy purposes. In Panel (a) a smoothing 
parameter equal to 400,000 is used in all the cases. In Panel (b) three combinations of smoothing parameters and rolling windows consistent in terms of the length 
of the credit cycle are presented. When rolling windows of 15 and 20 years are used, it is not possible to obtain estimations before the late 70’s crisis given that 
using data from 1965 lead to observe the first real-time estimations at 1980 and 1985, respectively.
Reducing the time horizon for which the filter is computed allows incorporating changes in the trend more quickly. Nonetheless, if the λ is not adjusted 
consistently, the inertia of the trend continue to be large.
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SOURCE: Own elaboration.
NOTE: The AUROC 16-5 quarters ahead of systemic events is presented. For the alternatives using rolling windows of 15 and 20 years, it is not possible to obtain
estimations before the late 70’s crisis given that the first real-time estimations are obtained in 1980 and 1985, respectively. For comparability, the thresholds used 
for the computation of type I/II errors and conditional probabilities are the reference values recommended for the Basel gap (BCBS, 2010). Nonetheless these 
thresholds could be optimized for each of the alternatives.
Using a rolling window of 15 years provides the best performance results.
Time horizon λ = 1,600 λ = 25,000 λ = 125,000 λ = 400,000
0.7797.097.057.001
0.8888.078.087.051
0.8128.048.087.002
0.7597.018.027.0elpmas lluF
AUROC COMPARISON OF THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP USING DIFFERENT COMBINATION OF ROLLING WINDOWS 
AND SMOOTHING PARAMETERS 
TABLE 4
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
NOTE: The vertical axis represents AUROC values and the horizontal axis represents quarters before the occurrence of systemic events in Spain. For the alternatives 
using rolling windows of 15 and 20 years, it is not possible to obtain estimations before the late 70’s crisis given that the first real-time estimations are obtained in 
1980 and 1985, respectively.
The alternatives using rolling windows of 15 and 20 years outperform the Basel gap consistently throughout the whole pre-crises periods in terms of 
predictive performance. 
AUROC OF THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP USING THE HP FILTER USING DIFFERENT ROLLING WINDOWS
AND CONSISTENT VALUES OF THE SMOOTHING PARAMETER (λ), AT EACH QUARTER AHEAD
OF CRISES (5-16 QUARTERS)
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4 Robustness
4.1 Other alternative filters
Although, the HP is one of the most commonly used filters for macroeconomic series, there 
are other statistical filters with properties that may be adequate for extracting the cyclical 
component of a time series. The most popular types of filters are high-pass and band-pass 
filters. High-pass filters characterises for allowing signals with a frequency higher than a 
certain cut-off. The HP and the Butterworth filters are the most popular. On the other hand, 
band-pass filters remove stochastic cycles outside of a specific band or length of the cycle, 
for which frequencies are unwanted. The Baxter and King and the Cristiano-Fitzgerald filters 
are the most common band-pass type filters. The main characteristics of each of these filters 
are summarized in Table 5.
As it was aforementioned, the HP filter is a trend-removal technique that estimates the 
trend by minimizing its distance to the actual series, and its time variation, where the smoothing 
parameter defines the weight of the time variation component. In general, the HP filter can be 
seen as a specific case of the Butterworth filter. 
The Butterworth filter (Butterworth, 1930; Pollock, 2000) is a signal-processing 
filter widely applied by engineers and macroeconomists because of its main property of 
having a frequency response as flat as possible in the pass-band. This filter estimates the 
components driven by stochastic cycles at specified frequencies when the original series is 
non-stationary. The mechanism of the Butterworth filter is to discard the stochastic cycles of 
higher periodicities than a determined period or cutoff. Thus, the filter requires specifying two 
parameters: the order of the filter, which determines the slope of the gain function, and the 
cutoff frequency. Implications and derivations of the most adequate orders for given cutoffs 
have been studied before by Pollock (2000). I follow these proposals for selecting proper 
orders for the frequencies assessed. 
SOURCE: Martínez and Oda (2018) and own elaboration.
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Chart 6 panel (a) plots the gap estimations using the Butterworth filter for cutoffs equivalent 
to 16, 24, and 30 years, which correspond to assumptions of lengths of credit cycles around two, three 
and four times the business cycle, respectively.6 It is observed that the Butterworth filter assuming 
a length of around 30 years (as the Basel methodology assumes for the HP filter) estimates very 
similar values to the Basel gap, although deviations are slightly lower. The filter assuming a length of 
the cycle around 16 years is very volatile and comparable to the case of the HP filter with λ equal 
to 1,600, which assumes shorter cycles (around 7.5 years). The most appropriate frequency of the 
filter would be the one assuming that the credit cycle has a length of 24 years (around three times 
the business cycle). In this case, the filter signals correctly the systemic event occurred during the 
90’s and generates much lower deviations from the long-run trend. In fact, this alternative currently 
estimates a gap close to 0, which has rapidly recover from the minimum at the end of the crisis. 
However, it also issues relatively low signals of imbalances during the pre-crisis period. In terms of 
performance, Table 6 summarizes the AUROC values for different periods ahead of the systemic 
events. It can be observed that this last alternative is the only one improving from the Basel gap. 
However, the best predictive performance of this filter seems to be very close to the onset of the 
crises, which also brings a problem to be considered for policy purposes. 
The Cristiano-Fitzgerald filter (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003) is a band-pass type of filter 
that separates stochastic cycles at periods smaller and greater than a determined range while 
assuming that the underlying variable follows a random-walk process. Under this assumption, the 
filter minimizes the mean squared error between an estimated component and a true component. 
This filter has been previously applied to the analysis of financial cycles. Recently, Aikman et al. 
(2015) apply this type of band-pass filter to long time series from a large set of countries, finding 
6  In particular, cutoffs in terms of quarters equal to 64, 96 and 120 periods are used. The corresponding orders of the filter 
used are 6, 3, and 2, following Pollock (2000). The case assuming a length of the credit cycle equivalent to that of the 
business cycle (around 7.5 years) cannot be estimated due to problems regarding the high value of the optimal order 
combination. In any case, assuming a length of 16 years already provide very volatile estimations of the gap.
SOURCE: Banco de España. Own elaboration.
NOTE: The grey shaded areas denote three financial stress periods identified in Spain since 1970, corresponding to two periods of systemic banking crises 
(1978-Q1 to 1985-Q3; 2009-Q1 to 2013-Q4) and one idiosyncratic event (1993-Q3 to 1994-Q3). The light grey shaded areas represent the period from 5 to 16 
quarters ahead of the onset of the systemic events, when it is desirable to identify risk signals for macroprudential policy purposes.
The alternative filters assuming a similar length for the credit cycles (black lines) exhibit lower variance of the gap estimations compared to the Basel gap. 
These filters also seem to be more sensitive to assuming lower lengths for the cycle.
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out high correlation between credit excess periods and subsequent financial crises, as well as 
longer financial cycles compared to business cycles. Drehmann et al. (2012) also apply a Cristiano-
Fitzgerald filter to a sample of developed countries, and find that financial cycles tend to last 
between 8 and 30 years. This range assumes a credit cycle up to 4 times the business cycle. 
Since our interest is to check potential improvements of assuming shorter lengths, I assess the 
Cristiano-Fitzgerald filter by changing the upper bound to be equivalent to 16, 24, and 30 years, 
which assumes credit cycles up to twice, three and four times the business cycle, respectively.7 The 
gap estimations obtained for the cycle component are presented in Chart 6 panel (b). In general, the 
estimations using this filter tend to be as persistent as the Basel gap. Only the alternative assuming 
a length of the cycle around 16 years clearly estimates lower deviations than the Basel gap and an 
increasing trend in the last few years. However, the signals issued before the two previous systemic 
events are not clear under this alternative. In fact, the predictive performance of the different versions 
of this filter is lower than that of the Basel gap (see Table 6). Moreover, similarly to the Butterworth 
filer, CF filters tend to provide improve their performance too-close to the occurrence of the crises.
Finally, the Baxter and King filter (Baxter and King, 1999) is a symmetric moving 
average filter that estimates the cyclical component using a weighted average of the leads 
and lags of the series. This property is related to its main drawback. In particular, there is a 
trade-off between choosing an enough large number of periods (leads/lags) that minimizes 
the difference between the coefficients in the filter and the ideal band-pass filter, and the 
consequent increase in missing observations. This is an important limitation from a policy 
perspective, since it would require to use forecasted data for a potentially large number of 
periods. Therefore, I do not assess this filter in this study. 
4.2 Model-based credit gap estimations
One of the main critiques to the use of statistical methods for the estimation of credit gaps is 
that these methods are unable to incorporate information from fundamental variables that may 
justify the equilibrium level of credit. On this regard, Castro et al. (2016) identified that joining the 
Euro implied a structural change in Spanish fundamentals that had effects on credit equilibrium 
7  In terms of quarters the upper bounds are set to 64, 96 and 120 quarters, respectively. As in the case of the Butterworth 
filter, the case of assuming a cycle length equal to that of the business cycle is not assessed given that it would imply 
changing the lower bound, which already takes this length into consideration.
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
The Butterworth filter provide similar predictive performance than the Basel gap. Nonetheless, its version assuming a credit cycle length equal to three 
times the business cycle presents the best performance. In contrast, the Cristiano-Fitzgerald filter underperforms the Basel gap.
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levels, which are not able to be captured by statistical methods in due time. In order to account for 
these factors, recent studies have proposed the use of models linking credit to other macrofinancial 
fundamental variables. Juselius et al. (2016) propose a measure of financial equilibrium in terms of a 
leverage and a debt-service gap, which are estimated from a VEC system that accounts for interest 
rates and asset prices. Several other studies have identified the importance of accounting for real 
estate prices when estimating credit given the relevant cyclical similarities that both variables share 
(Schüler et al., 2015; Rünstler and Vlekke, 2017). Lang and Welz (2018) propose a semi-structural 
unobserved components model for household credit that account for long-term interest rates and 
institutional quality. Galán and Mencía (2018) propose an unobserved components and a VEC 
model for estimating long-run equilibrium levels of total credit accounting for GDP, long-term interest 
rates and house prices. The authors find that these methods outperform the Basel gap in terms 
of early warning performance, present lower deviations from long-run equilibrium levels after rapid 
variations of credit, and may deal better with structural changes in a sample of six EU countries.
Chart 7 presents the estimated gaps using the HP filter and the model-based indicators. 
It is observed that, model-based indicators provided clearer signals of imbalances previous to 
the systemic events occurred in the late 70’s and early 90’s, although each model identifies 
properly only one of these events. It is also remarkable that both models recognize the first stage 
of credit growth observed after Spain joined the Euro in 1999, as justified by macro-financial 
fundamentals. After the last financial crisis, both models exhibit lower negative deviations than 
the statistical-counterparts. Nonetheless, the statistical adaptations of the HP filter with lower 
smoothing parameters evidence clearer a change in the trend of the deviations. Also, the current 
deviations of credit from the estimated long-run equilibria are similar between these models and 
the HP filter using a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000.
SOURCE: Banco de España and Galán and Mencía (2018). Own elaboration.
NOTE: The grey shaded areas denote three financial stress periods identified in Spain since 1970, corresponding to two periods of systemic banking crises 
(1978-Q1 to 1985-Q3; 2009-Q1 to 2013-Q4) and one idiosyncratic event (1993-Q3 to 1994-Q3). The light grey shaded areas represent the period from 5 to 16 
quarters ahead of the onset of the systemic events, when it is desirable to identify risk signals for macroprudential policy purposes. Gaps estimated from UCM and 
VEC models represent deviations of the observed credit level as a percentage of the long-run estimated equilibrium. In the case of the statistical filters, these values 
represent the credit-to-GDP gap in percentage points as in previous figures.
Model-based indicators tend to exhibit clearer signals before the first two systemic events, and justify the credit growth observed around 2000. These 
indicators also present a lower downward bias after the last crisis. Nonetheless, their estimated deviations are currently very similar to that of the 
credit-to-GDP gap estimated using the HP filter with λ equal to 25,000.
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It is also interesting to check whether or not the adaptations of the HP filter proposed 
in this study are outperformed by model-based indicators in terms of predictive performance. 
Table 7 presents this comparison against the four best alternatives of the HP filter analyzed above. 
Interestingly, the performance of the models is not very different from that of the adaptations of the 
HP filter assuming a lower length of credit cycle.8 This is also observed when the AUROC by quarter 
before the crises is computed (see Chart 8). While the VEC model performs better in predicting 
crises around four years before the events, its performance is similar to that of the alternative HP 
filters for later periods. 
8  Nonetheless, it is important to notice that, although the HP filter adaptation using a rolling window of 15 years presents 
the best AUROC values, the window length used in this case avoid assessing the performance before the first systemic 
crisis. If the AUROC of the VEC model is computed only from 1980, its results improve to 0.95 and 0.96 for 5-12 and 
5-16 quarters ahead of systemic events, respectively. 
SOURCE: Galán and Mencía (2018) and own elaboration.
NOTE: For the alternatives using a rolling windows of 15 years, it is not possible to obtain estimations before the late 70’s crisis given that the first real-time 
estimations is obtained in 1980. For comparability, the thresholds used for the computation of type I/II errors and conditional probabilities are the reference values 
recommended for the Basel gap (BCBS, 2010). Nonetheless these thresholds could be optimized for each of the alternatives.
The performance of the best HP filter alternatives is comparable to that of model-based estimations.
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PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE HP FILTERS VS MODEL-BASED INDICATORS TABLE 7
SOURCE: Own elaboration and Galán and Mencía (2018).
NOTE: The vertical axis represents AUROC values and the horizontal axis represents quarters before the occurrence of systemic events in Spain. For the alternative 
using a rolling windows of 15 years, it is not possible to obtain estimations before the late 70’s crisis given that the first real-time estimations is obtained in 1980.
The predictive performance of the best HP filter adaptations is similar to that of model-based indicators along the whole pre-crises period.
AUROC OF ALTERNATIVE HP FILTERS VS MODEL-BASED INDICATORS AT EACH QUARTER AHEAD OF CRISES 
(5-16 QUARTERS)
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4.3 Is this valid only for Spain?
The specific characteristics of the last credit cycle in Spain may be behind the main limitations 
of the Basel gap in providing useful signals of credit imbalances in the near term. In fact, the 
magnitude of credit growth after joining the euro, which lasted almost up to the onset of 
the crisis, and the subsequent deep drop, exacerbated the deviations introduced by the long-
memory of the HP filter computed as in the Basel methodology. Thus, it is interesting to check 
if lowering the smoothing parameter also improves from the Basel gap in other EU countries. In 
fact, empirical studies have identified lower lengths of the credit cycle (between 15 and 25 years) 
in samples that cover several EU countries (see Drehmann et al., 2010; Drehmann et al., 2011). 
In order to check this, I use a sample of 13 EU countries with available series on the credit-to-
GDP ratio beginning before 1975. I collect data from the ECB and the dates and definitions 
reported by countries in the ECB/ESRB crises database recently published in Lo Duca et al. 
(2017).9 In particular, I estimate the HP filter for the 13 countries using smoothing parameters 
equal to 25,000 and 125,000 in addition to the Basel gap. 
Chart 9 plots the results for the median and the 10th and 90th percentiles of the pooled 
distributions of the gap estimates in a range of 20 quarters around the onset of systemic 
crises. Results show that the higher the smoothing parameter, the greater the estimated gaps 
both positive and negative. Before crises all alternatives evidence signals of imbalances in 
more than 50% of the systemic events. However, the 10th percentile exhibits negative values 
of the gap during pre-crises periods, which are more evident under the filter based on the 
Basel methodology. Nonetheless, the differences between the different alternatives are more 
evident after the crises. It is observed that the lower the smoothing parameter, the earlier 
9  All crises and residual financial stress events considered to be relevant from a macroprudential perspective are included. 
The length of the series varies across countries with the longest starting at 1970Q1 and the shortest starting at 2005Q1.
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
NOTE: The blue solid line represents the median and the dashed lines represent the 10th and 90th percentile of the credit-to-GDP gap around crises, respectively. 
The horizontal axis represents the number of quarters before and after systemic crises. The vertical dashed line signals the beginning of systemic crises. The 
horizontal line represents the median of the credit-to-GDP gap in normal times (out of the range -20 to 20 quarters around systemic crises).
Using lower λ values for the HP filter also improve the predictive performance of the estimated gaps in other EU countries. Lower λ values tend to correct 
both the absence of early warning signals and the post-crises downward biases in a proportion of previous systemic events in the EU.
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the gaps decrease recognizing faster the downturn of the cycle. In particular, the median 
gap turns negative 8, 12 and 16 quarters after the onset of crises using values of λ equal to 
25,000, 125,000 and 400,000, respectively. The 10th percentile also evidences that the higher 
the smoothing parameter, the steeper and more pronounced the decreases in the gaps after 
crises. In fact, in the case of the Basel gap the 10th percentile decreases more than 30pp 
between 2 and 4 years after the crises and it stays at those low values even 5 years after the 
onset of the events. 
Table 8 presents the AUROC values for two different ranges of quarters ahead of 
the onset of the events, as well as the quarter of maximum AUROC. It is observed that the 
predictive performance ahead of crises improves when lowering the smoothing parameter, 
being the highest when λ is equal to 25,000. This alternative also provides the best signals 
earlier than the Basel gap. These results suggest that adapting the HP filter in terms of the 
smoothing parameter for estimating the credit-to-GDP gap may also be a better alternative for 
providing faster signals of imbalances during the next cycle in several other countries in Europe 
besides Spain.
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
Adapting the HP filter to assume lower length of the credit cycle also improves the predictive performance in other 
EU countries.
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5 Concluding remarks
The Basel gap is the reference indicator proposed by the BCBS and recommended by the 
ESRB at the European level to guide the decisions on the activation, calibration and release 
of the CCyB. The indicator presents advantages in terms of its simplicity, which makes it 
easy to compute and communicate, and also in terms of its relatively good performance as 
an early warning indicator of previous systemic crises. However, the Basel gap also features 
some limitations, which have become more evident after the last financial crisis. In particular, 
after intense credit contractions it suffers of downward biases leading to the estimation of 
large negative values for the gap in many countries, even currently after several years from 
the end of the crisis. The main negative implication of this situation is that it will take a long 
time for the indicator to provide accurate signals of the build-up of cyclical systemic risk 
during the next cycle. Due to this situation, most countries activating the CCyB in recent 
years are not following the signals issued by the Basel gap. The main reason behind this 
problem is the large inertia of the long-run trend estimated using the Basel methodology. In 
particular, the BCBS proposes to use a one-sided HP filter with a smoothing parameter equal 
to 400,000. This value was recommended in Drehmann et al. (2010) after assuming that 
the length of a credit cycle is as long as four times that of a business cycle (i.e. around 30 
years). Nonetheless, this assumption is far from being realistic for many countries. Empirical 
studies have identified lengths of the credit cycle ranging on average between 15 and 25 
years in samples that cover developed and emerging economies (see Drehmann et al., 2011; 
Drehmann et al., 2012). In particular, the empirical evidence for Spain suggests that financial 
cycles have historically a length of 17 years on average (see Bedayo et al., 2018 for an 
analysis stretching back to 1880).
This paper assesses whether the performance of the HP filter improves when it is 
allowed to introduce assumptions in line with empirical evidence on the length of the credit cycle. 
This improvement is measured not only in terms of early warning signals but also in terms of the 
magnitude of deviations around crises. In particular, I assess the effects of using lower values 
of the smoothing parameter as well as rolling windows that allow dropping old information. 
Results suggest that changing the smoothing parameter has primarily an effect on lowering the 
amplitude of the estimated gaps, which may avoid exacerbating the deviations from the long-run 
trend after large variations of the ratio. The use of rolling windows tend to have a more important 
effect on the speed of incorporating changes in the trends of the estimated gaps, which would 
allow earlier identification of potential risk signals. 
In particular, in the case of Spain, using a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000 
appears to improve the early warning performance of the indicator significantly compared to 
the Basel definition. This value of the smoothing parameter is equivalent to assuming a length 
of the credit cycle of around 15 years, which is very close to the empirical evidence for Spain. 
Importantly, the computation of the filter with this smoothing parameter seems to address more 
properly biases after periods of large variations in the credit-to-GDP ratio, as those observed in 
Spain during the last financial cycle. 
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Similar results are obtained when selecting a rolling window equal to 15 years. In this 
case the early warning performance improves the most among the assessed alternatives. This 
alternative also provides estimations with lower deviations than the Basel gap. In general, when 
using rolling windows, the sensitivity to the use of large smoothing parameters is low. Overall, 
current estimations of the gap with HP filters assuming a shorter length of the credit cycle are 
more consistent with the last definition of the macroprudential stance and the analysis of other 
cyclical risk indicators presented by Banco de España (BdE, 2018). 
Regarding the use of other alternative statistical filters, I find that they are also sensible 
to changes in their parameters that would imply different assumptions regarding the length of the 
financial cycle. The performance of these indicators is found to improve with respect to the Basel 
gap under certain specifications. Nonetheless, the alternative HP filters proposed outperform 
these other filtering methods. I also find that the proposed adaptations of the HP filter provide 
similar performance than model-based indicators of credit imbalances. Finally, I identify that 
although the length of the financial cycles is heterogeneous among countries, assuming a lower 
length (between 15 and 22 years) corrects potential biases in several EU countries. 
Overall, our results suggests that statistical methods and, in particular, the HP filter still 
deserves a chance as an early warning indicator of cyclical systemic risk once the assumption on 
the length of the cycles is relaxed. This adjustment can be justified by empirical evidence on the 
length of the cycles in each country. Nonetheless, it is important to remark that the characteristics 
of the financial cycles change over time, and that these assumptions may not necessarily be 
valid in the future. Thus, complementing the information provided by statistical methods with 
individual indicators, structural models and qualitative information is of great importance in the 
assessment of cyclical systemic risk and the calibration of the CCyB.
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Annex 1
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
NOTE: The AUROC 16-5 quarters ahead of systemic events is presented. Type I and II errors are computed at a threshold equivalent to a 2pp gap.
Time horizon Performance criterion λ = 1,600 λ = 25,000 λ = 125,000 λ = 400,000
77.097.097.057.0CORUA
Type I error 9.6% 5.4% 5.3% 5.3%
Type II error 87.1% 79.8% 79.5% 79.5%
%0.88%0.88%0.78%0.87CORUA
Type I error 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Type II error 81.7% 71.8% 73.9% 74.5%
%0.18%0.28%0.48%0.87CORUA
Type I error 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Type II error 80.6% 71.8% 75.3% 76.5%
%0.57%0.97%0.18%0.27CORUA
Type I error 9.8% 5.1% 5.3% 8.8%
Type II error 87.5% 77.5% 79.5% 85.5%
10
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20
Full sample
COMPARISON BY PERFORMANCE CRITERION OF THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP USING DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS 
OF ROLLING WINDOWS AND SMOOTHING PARAMETER (λ )
TABLE A1
SOURCE: Banco de España. Own elaboration.
NOTE: The grey shaded areas denote three financial stress periods identified in Spain since 1970, corresponding to two periods of systemic banking crises 
(1978-Q1 to 1985-Q3; 2009-Q1 to 2013-Q4) and one idiosyncratic event (1993-Q3 to 1994-Q3). ). The light grey shaded areas represent the period from 5 to 16 
quarters ahead of the onset of the systemic events, when it is desirable to identify risk signals for macroprudential policy purposes.
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